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Editorial
This issue of the ESR Review coincides with the 
celebration of Human Rights Day in Africa on 
21 October, which commemorates the coming 
into force of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter). 
The  African  Charter,  which  is  almost  universally  ratified  by  
member states of the African Union, was adopted in 1981 but 
came into force on 21 October 1986. 
It was one of the earliest regional human rights instruments 
to guarantee, in one document, civil and political rights as well 
as economic, social and cultural rights. The African Charter has 
been celebrated for its comprehensive approach to human rights 
including the promotion and protection of individual, social 
and people’s rights. In a continent where millions of people 
are deprived of access to basic social amenities such as water, 
electricity, sanitation and employment, the African Charter could 
not have come at a better time. 
Sadly, however, more than three decades after the African 
Charter came into force, the living conditions of many people in 
Africa have not really improved. Many people still live in abject 
poverty, lack access to housing, employment and health care 
services. 
There is a disconnect between what is guaranteed in the African 
Charter and the realities of many Africans. Thus, the articles in 
this issue of the ESR Review address some of the socio-economic 
rights issues that are important in improving the living conditions 
of many Africans. 
Brian Ray’s article assesses the decision of the court in Hlophe v 
City of Johannesburg on the importance of meaningful engagement 
in eviction cases in South Africa. It lauds the court’s decision, 
which emphasised the need for provincial governments to adopt a 
proactive and reasonable plan of action in evictions. 
Wouter van Ginneken’s article addresses the importance of social 
protection in combating poverty. He argues that social protection 
is a human rights issue and urges states to adopt and implement 
comprehensive   national   social   protection   floors,   which   must  
address food security, health care, education, water sanitation, 
housing and social security. 
This issue also includes a book review by Ebenezer Durojaye 
and updates on recent developments on human rights at the 
international and African regional levels. 
We hope you will enjoy reading it.
Dr Ebenezer Durojaye (Editor)
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authority that engagement creates to craft and manage 
a process that directly addresses the bureaucratic and ad-
ministrative failures her questions aim to identify. 
I’ll start in the middle of the case’s complicated pro-
cedural history and skip over some details to simplify the 
story. Relying on Blue Moonlight, the occupants in June 
2012 secured a High Court order requiring the City of Jo-
hannesburg to provide accommodation before they were 
evicted. The City failed to provide accommodation by the 
deadline  and  instead  filed  a  report  with  the  court  stating  
it lacked the resources to satisfy the order. The occupants 
then brought the Hlophe action to enforce the accommo-
dation  order.  The  High  Court  confirmed  the  original  order,  
and once again required the City to report back, this time 
by 20 March 2013, providing details on the accommoda-
tion it would provide. In this second report, the City stated 
it was still unable to provide accommodation and request-
ed  an  indefinite  delay.  
Following this second report Judge Satchwell ‘invit[ed]’ 
the Executive Mayor, City Manager and Director of Hous-
ing to attend a hearing to address her concerns about the 
City’s  reports.  Specifically,  the  judge  was  concerned  that:
officials   from   legal   departments   rather   than   officials  •
with substantive expertise in ‘planning, budgetary, 
town planning, urban development and housing’ pre-
pared both reports; 
the City detailed its overall mission and planning proc-•
esses, accommodation provided to other people and 
budgetary constraints but provided no information on 
possible accommodation for the occupants; 
the reports were in essence ‘• pleas in misericordiam’
seeking to excuse the City’s failure; 
the  first  report  showed  that  the  City  had  not  attempted  •
to take steps to comply with the original order and in-
stead ‘the past and present were simply described and 
the future hoped for’; and 
the second report showed that the City waited eight •
months after the original order (and 14 months after
Blue Moonlight) to take even the most preliminary steps 
towards  finding  accommodation  (Hlophe para 21). 
Referring to Blue Moonlight, she concluded that the re-
ports ‘indicate an attitude on the part of the City which is 
only very reluctantly (if at all) compliant with the directions 
of the Constitutional Court’ (Hlophe para 22). Rather than 
giving  the  City  yet  another  opportunity  to  find  accommo-
dation in this case, she instead ordered the City to answer 
detailed questions about its overall emergency housing 
programme and policies, including identifying the: 
Courts, capacity and engagement
Lessons from Hlophe v City of Johannesburg 
Brian Ray
I cannot and do not claim to have any knowledge of town 
planning, urban development, provision of housing or 
budgeting therefore or management of large corpora-
tions. But I do believe the questions to which I require 
answers will propel the City into (if not a whirl) at least a 
flow  of  directed  and  focused  action  (Hlophe v City of Jo-
hannesburg, [2013] ZAGPJHC 98, 3 May 2013, at para 27)
(Hlophe). 
This disclaimer was part of a remarkable 
judgment by Judge Kathy Satchwell of the South 
Gauteng High Court in a case addressing the City 
of Johannesburg’s repeated failures over a period 
of 11 months to comply with an order to house a 
group of people facing eviction from a privately 
owned building in the city centre. 
The  case  was  one  of  the  first  applying  the  Constitutional  
Court’s holding in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Munic-
ipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another, 
(2) BCLR 150 (CC) (1 December 2011) (Blue Moonlight) that 
municipalities have an independent obligation to plan and 
budget for the emergency accommodation needs of peo-
ple evicted from private property. The City also was the de-
fendant in that case, and so its repeated failures to accom-
modate the occupants in Hlophe demonstrated a broader 
failure to implement the planning, budget and policy re-
quirements  that  flowed  from  Blue Moonlight. Judge Satch-
well recognised this and issued a complex order that at-
tempts to grapple, at a systemic level, with the root causes 
of  the  City’s  general  inability  to  fulfil  its  obligations  under  
section 26. 
In this short comment I’ll use the case and this innova-
tive  order  to  argue  that  the  systemic  approach  it  reflects  is  
an appropriate expansion of a more intrusive procedural 
role for courts to enforce the social rights provisions. I’ll ar-
gue further that the meaningful engagement requirement 
that  was  first  applied  in  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johan-
nesburg and Others, 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (19 February 
2008) (Olivia Road) provides both a doctrinal framework 
and an institutional mechanism for that expansion. Courts 
applying engagement have thus far failed to fully exploit 
this procedural authority. Judge Satchwell’s order shows 
that courts can and should seek to identify the root causes 
of  government’s  failure  to  fulfil   its  obligations  under  sec-
tion 26 and other rights. But she, too, missed the oppor-
tunity to take the next step by invoking the procedural 
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structure or structures [that] implement the housing 
arrangements required to be implemented in the Blue 
Moonlight case, with reference to the personnel involved, 
skills available, liaison undertaken, time availed from oth-
er duties, management and direction of implementation 
(Hlophe Order para 2.a.iii). 
She insisted the City could not simply identify alternative 
accommodation ‘and then state it is unnecessary to an-
swer’ these programmatic questions (Hlophe para 32). 
In other words, Judge Satchwell ordered the City to 
identify its overall capacity and describe its general plan-
ning process for meeting the ongoing obligations that Blue 
Moonlight imposed. In doing so, she recognised that the 
City’s failure here was merely a symptom of this broader 
lack of capacity and of its refusal to take seriously its obli-
gation to plan and budget in ways that sought to develop 
that capacity. As the judge explained it, her pointed ques-
tions were ‘premised upon a view that management to-
wards an outcome must be planned, focused and directed 
toward that outcome’ and sought ‘to address the many dif-
ficulties  and  problems  upon  which  the  City  relies  to  explain  
its failure to take any concrete steps over the past eleven 
months towards compliance with the court order’ (Hlophe 
para 33). The list of concerns about the City’s reports that 
the judge cited made essentially the same point: its failure 
to recognise the need to develop the expertise and admin-
istrative infrastructure necessary to meet its constitutional 
obligations, not only in this case but across the board in 
similar situations, made it futile to continue to demand 
compliance  with  the  specific  order  only  in  this  case.  
Judge Satchwell’s detailed questions and focus on the 
City’s  general  capacity  to  fulfil  the  obligations  created  by  
Blue Moonlight reflects  the  kind  of  procedurally  active  role  
that  the  Constitutional  Court  first  described   in  Port Eliza-
beth Municipality v Various Occupiers, 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 
(CC) (1 October 2004) (Port Elizabeth) and then developed 
into the meaningful engagement requirement in Olivia 
Road. Justice Albie Sachs in Port Elizabeth called for courts 
‘to go beyond [their] normal functions, and to engage in 
active judicial management’ when addressing the kind of 
‘ongoing, stressful, law-governed social process[es]’ that 
social rights claims frequently raise. Olivia Road grounded 
that role in the meaningful engagement requirement that 
gives courts the authority to examine not only the sub-
stance of social welfare programmes but also the process 
government used to develop them. There the Constitu-
tional  Court   identified   a   free-­‐standing   constitutional   ob-
‘
‘
The case recognises the futility of 
repeatedly ordering the City to deliver 
a service it failed to adequately plan and 
budget to deliver
‘
‘ ligation   for   government   to   consult   with   people   affected  
by social policy and civil society groups representing their 
interests. In describing the core features of engagement, 
the Constitutional Court insisted that the government’s 
obligation goes beyond simple ad-hoc consultation once 
litigation arises and requires an administrative infrastruc-
ture and trained personnel to provide opportunities for 
ongoing consultation throughout the policy-development 
process. 
Judge Satchwell’s insistence that the City answer ques-
tions about its overall structures, personnel and planning 
for  housing  delivery   reflects  a   similar   concern  with  mov-
ing beyond individual disputes to get at the root causes 
behind them. Both Olivia Road and Hlophe rest on the 
basic premise that municipalities have an obligation to in-
dependently consider and develop the capacity for imple-
menting their obligations under section 26. Both decisions 
also   recognise   that   fulfilling   these   obligations   requires  
incorporating attention to them into broader planning 
processes. Olivia Road emphasised the democratic- and 
dignity-­‐enhancing   effects   of   consulting   with   people   di-
rectly  affected  by  state  policies  and  programmes.  Hlophe 
recognises that planning must include a range of technical 
expertise relevant to housing delivery.
But neither case developed the full potential of this 
stronger procedural role to address the root causes Hlophe 
identifies.  Olivia Road focused on humanising and manag-
ing individual evictions, and meaningful engagement has 
largely remained a case-management device with only an-
cillary  effects  on  broader  planning.  The  Court’s  criteria  for  
engagement, including detailed reporting on engagement 
efforts,  the  need  for  training  in  the  engagement,  and  espe-
cially its insistence that engagement should begin early in 
any large-scale policy development, give courts the power 
to require changes not just to the substance of policies but 
to the way municipalities develop them. Olivia Road’s key 
insight is that courts can and should sometimes intervene 
in overall processes, not just in individual cases.
Judge Satchwell’s order in Hlophe and especially her in-
sistence on obtaining detailed general information even if 
the  City  finally  complied  with  the  housing  order  shifts  the  
focus in precisely that direction. Rather than asking only 
why   the  City   failed   these   plaintiffs,   the   order   notes   the  
clear link between this failure and others and the futility 
of repeatedly ordering the City to deliver a service it failed 
to adequately plan and budget to deliver. Throughout the 
judgment Satchwell repeated the need for the City to ad-
dress ‘planning, budgetary, town planning, urban devel-
opment and housing’ issues (Hlophe para 21.a). She also 
highlighted the City’s extensive foot-dragging in the face 
of Blue Moonlight’s clear holding that it is required to plan 
and budget for these situations:
The City has had potential indication of its general re-
sponsibilities  for  a  period  of  some  38  months  and  final  in-
dication  of  its  specific  responsibilities  for  a  period  of  some  
16 months (Hlophe para 5). 
As she explained, the point of demanding information 
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about the City’s technical capacity and planning process 
is  to  ‘propel  the  City  into  (if  not  a  whirl)  at  least  a  flow  of  
directed and focused action’ to deal comprehensively with 
the problem of emergency housing (Hlophe para 27). 
But Judge Satchwell stopped short of actually interven-
ing in these larger issues. In other parts of the judgment 
she took a constrained view of the scope of her authority as 
largely limited to resolving this case. Most telling in this re-
spect, the judge insisted that the only purpose of her ques-
tions was the ‘provision of temporary accommodation for 
these applicants sooner rather than later’ (Hlophe para 33, 
emphasis added). This echoed her scathing critique of the 
City’s  presentation  of  its  general  efforts  to  house  evictees  
as irrelevant to the original order that required only details 
of the ‘solution achieved’ to the applicants’ own pending 
homelessness (Hlophe para 21.c). By limiting engagement 
to  a  set  of  case-­‐specific   issues  and  only  asking  questions  
about the City’s overall capacity, Judge Satchwell was 
left merely hoping to ‘propel’ the City itself to solve these 
structural problems.
Connecting Hlophe and Olivia Road moves past the 
mistaken perception that courts’ authority is or should 
be  limited  to  resolving  case-­‐specific  issues  in  social  rights  
cases.  Rather   than  stopping  with  what  was,   in  effect,  an  
attempt to embarrass the City by exposing its failure to 
take the necessary steps to satisfy Blue Moonlight, a court 
could use the procedural power engagement provides to 
initiate and manage a process designed to force the City to 
make those same changes directly. This wouldn’t, as Judge 
Satchwell worries, require a court itself to take on the sig-
nificant   technical   issues   involved.   Instead,   the   engage-
ment order could incorporate consultation with experts in 
each  of  the  fields  she  identified.  
The Constitutional Court has already expanded the en-
gagement requirement to some extent in ways that lay the 
groundwork for doing this. Most recently, in Schubart Park 
Residents Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Mu-
nicipality, 2013 (1) BCLR 68 (CC) (9 October 2012) (Schubart 
Park) Justice Froneman recognised the expansive scope of 
engagement. He noted that ‘[n]ormally supervision and 
engagement orders accompany eviction orders where 
they relate to the provision of temporary accommoda-
tion  pending  final  eviction’  but   found   ‘there   is  no   reason  
why they cannot be made in other circumstances where 
it is appropriate and necessary’ (Schubart Park para 42.) In 
both Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue v City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another, 2012 (9) BCLR 951 
(CC) (24 May 2012) and its unreported order in Mamba 
and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, 78 
CCT65/08 (Court Order dated 21 August 2008), the Court 
ordered outside organisations to participate in and facili-
tate the engagement processes. 
Like Hlophe, the engagement orders in these cases 
ultimately  focused  on  resolving  case-­‐specific  issues  or  im-
plementing  case-­‐specific  orders.  They  did  not  directly  ad-
dress the systemic problems at play and the outside par-
ties had some stake in the outcome. Engagement’s true 
potential lies in the authority it creates for courts to order 
the   government   and   plaintiffs   to   consult  with   experts   in  
the kinds of issues Judge Satchwell’s incisive questions 
identify – housing delivery, urban planning and budgeting 
– and to structure solutions on a larger scale, with the aim 
of creating broader processes and building general capac-
ity to address the root causes of the situations that lead 
to   specific   litigation.   Judge   Satchwell’s   innovative   order  
recognises the need for courts to take this next step but 
missed the possibility of using engagement as the vehicle 
to insist on those changes. The City of Johannesburg is not 
unique in its failure to address its social rights obligations 
on a broader scale. Hlophe paves the way for other courts 
in other cases to craft processes that bring government, 
poor people, civil society and other experts together to 
begin working on the logistical and budget challenges of 
fulfilling  the  promise  of  social  rights.
Brian Ray is an Associate Professor of Law, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
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